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Motivation
“When I was lost in Paris, knowing the high cost of roaming, I
turned on the data service to locate myself on the map. I expected
it would be expensive. What I did not expect is that a single
viewing of the map would cost 100 euros – cleaning out my
account and making my phone unusable in the process.”
David K. Levine
(12/21/2010 on http://www.againstmonopoly.org)
Motivation
I David K. Levine’s back-of-the-envelope calculations:
I Data roaming: TIM $10/MB; T-mobile $15 per megabyte
(typical business user 15 megabytes per day of email).
I Local data prices: TIM $25 per month for 5 gigabytes of data
($0.005/MB). T-mobile in the US charges a similar amount for
similar service;
I Why are international data roaming rates so high?
I Very little analysis on roaming; Salsas & Koboldt (2004); Lupi
& Manenti (2006) and (2008); Stu¨hmeier (2010); Roaming
alliances: Buehler (2009);
I Common assumption: Symmetry in the setup of the
countries.
I Do asymmetries across countries play a role? Can they be
exploited by regulators?
I Related: Policy discussion on whether to make data roaming
compulsory (LTE). Do we need compulsory roaming? When?
This paper
I We model international data roaming pricing of mobile
operators taking into account
I relative degree of competition in provision of roaming access;
I possible cross-border integration of mobile operators;
I We argue that asymmetries in the competitive setup and the
distribution of bargaining power between providers in different
countries matter
I for mark-up;
I for how much international integration inflates roaming charges
(c.f. Bu¨hler, 2009 – symmetric competition and integration);
I for whether integrated provider wants to have a roaming
agreement with other providers.
Model 1
I Two countries, A and B;
I Country A: one provider, also A, provides roaming access to
subscribers from country B;
I Country B: up to two providers, B1 and B2, provide roaming
access to subscribers from country A;
I Subscribers of A pay retail roaming prices pAB1 and pAB2 per
unit to A for using B1’s and B2’s network respectively;
I Subscribers of B1 and B2 pay retail roaming prices pB1A and
pB2A per unit to B1 and B2, respectively;
Model 2
I Providing roaming services to the other country’s users costs
c per unit;
I Pairs of providers A and B1 and A and B2 have to agree on
the roaming charge r1 and r2 per unit, respectively.
I Inverse demand for roaming services
pAB1 = α− xAB1 − γxAB2
pAB2 = α− xAB2 − γxAB1
pB1A = α− xB1A − γxB2A
pB2A = α− xB2A − γxB1A
with α > c
Scenarios
1. Symmetric scenario: Monopoly in both countries (providers A
and B1);
2. Asymmetric scenario: Monopoly in A, duopoly in B (providers
A, B1, and B2);
3. Asymmetric scenario: Monopoly in A, duopoly in B (providers
A, B1, and B2), and integration between A and B1.
Timing
1. International roaming charges are set between pairs of
providers across countries;
2. Retail roaming prices are set by providers in each country;
3. Users observe offered roaming prices by each operator and
decide how much to consume of international roaming
services, and providers’ profits are realized.
Monopoly in both countries
I Providers A and B1 only
I Provider A solves
max
pAB1
[(pAB1 − r1) xAB1 + (r1 − c) xB1A] ,
I Provider B1 solves
max
pB1A
[(pB1A − r1) xB1A + (r1 − c) xAB1 ] ,
I p∗AB1 = p
∗
B1A
= p∗ = α+r12 ; x
∗
AB1
= x∗B1A = x
∗ = α−r12 ;
Monopoly in both countries
I Both providers preferred roaming charge solves
max
r
[x∗ (p∗ − c)]
I r∗ = c .
I There is mutual moderation.
Monopoly in both countries
Proposition
Under symmetric domestic competition, the equilibrium roaming
fee, retail international roaming prices and quantity demanded for
international roaming are as follows: rSC = c, pSC = α+c2 > c and
xSC = α−c2 .
Remark
Under symmetric domestic competition in the provision of
international Internet roaming services between home and foreign
countries, in equilibrium a mutual moderation effect prevails:
providers entering reciprocal roaming agreements, reach a
consensus about compensating each other using a common, and
not inflated, roaming fee leading to mobile international retail data
roaming prices and traffics to converge, as in Rey (2004).
Monopoly in A and Duopoly in B
I Provider Bi , i = 1, 2 solves
max
pBi A
[(pBiA − ri ) xBiA + (ri − c) xABi ] ;
I Provider A solves
max
pAB1 ,pAB2
[(pAB1 − r1) xAB1 + (pAB2 − r2) xAB2
+ (r1 − c) xB1A + (r2 − c) xB2A] ;
I p∗ABi =
α+ri
2 , p
∗
BiA
=
α(2−γ−γ2)+2ri+γr−i
4−γ2 ;
I x∗ABi ; x
∗
BiA
follow.
Monopoly in A and Duopoly in B
I Provider A’s preferred roaming charges solve
max
r1,r2
[(
p∗AB1 − r1
)
x∗AB1 +
(
p∗AB2 − r2
)
x∗AB2
+ (r1 − c) x∗B1A + (r2 − c) x∗B2A
]
;
leading to r∗1,A = r
∗
2,A = r
∗
A =
2c+αγ
2+γ ≥ c
I Provider Bi ’s preferred roaming charge solves
max
ri
[(
p∗BiA − ri
)
x∗BiA + (ri − c) x∗ABi
]
;
leading to r∗i ,B =
−c(−2+γ)2(2+γ)+αγ(4+γ(−6+γ+γ2))
−8+γ(8−4γ+γ3) ≤ c
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Figure: Preferred roaming fee with competition in B. α = 1.5, c = 1.
I Let the operators in the more competitive country decide on
roaming charge.
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Monopoly in A and Duopoly in B
Proposition
Under asymmetric domestic competition, for any given γ, the
equilibrium mutually agreed international roaming fee depends on
the relative bargaining power of operator in country A as compared
to that of operators in country B:
I if all the bargaining power is with operator in country A, the
equilibrium international roaming fees and retail roaming
prices are larger and the quantities demanded for international
roaming lower, than under symmetric domestic competition;
and,
I if all the bargaining power is with operators in country B, the
equilibrium international roaming fees and retail roaming
prices are smaller and the quantities demanded for
international roaming higher, than under symmetric domestic
competition.
Monopoly in A and Duopoly in B with Integration
I Providers A and B1 are integrated;
I Provider B2 solves
max
pB2A
[(pB2A − ri ) xB2A + (r2 − c) xAB2 ] ;
I Integrated provider I solves
max
pAB1 ,pAB2 ,pB1A
[(pAB1 − r1) xAB1 + (pAB2 − r2) xAB2
+ (r1 − c) xB1A + (r2 − c) xB2A
+ (pB1A − r1) xB1A + (r1 − c) xAB1 ] ;
I p∗AB1 =
α+c
2 , p
∗
AB2
= α+r22 , p
∗
B1A
=
2c(1−γ)+3r2γ+α(2−γ−γ2)
4−γ2 ,
and p∗B2A =
r2(2+γ2)+(1−γ)(cγ+α(2+γ))
4−γ2 ;
I x∗ABi ; x
∗
BiA
follow.
Monopoly in A and Duopoly in B with Integration
I r1 is irrelevant as it does not affect profits;
I Provider I ’s preferred roaming charge solves
max
r2
[(
p∗AB1 − c
)
x∗AB1 +
(
p∗AB2 − r2
)
x∗AB2
+
(
p∗B1A − c
)
x∗B1A + (r2 − c) x∗B2A
]
leading to r∗2,I > c for small γ and does not want to have a
roaming agreement with B2 for high γ;
I Provider B2’s preferred roaming charge solves
max
r2
[(
p∗B2A − r2
)
x∗B2A + (r2 − c) x∗AB2
]
;
leading to r∗2,B ≤ c for small γ and r∗2,B ≥ c for high γ.
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Figure: Preferred roaming fees with competition in B and integration.
α = 1.5, c = 1.
I Again: Let the non-integrated operator in the more
competitive country decide on roaming charge.
I Force roaming.
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Monopoly in A and Duopoly in B with Integration
Proposition
Under asymmetric domestic competition with international
integration the equilibrium international roaming fee depends on
the relative bargaining power of the integrated structure and
non-integrated operator in country B as well as the degree of
competition between operators in country B.
I For a sufficiently low degree of competition between operators
in country B, γ ∈ [0, γ∗[,
1. if all the bargaining power is with the integrated structure, the
equilibrium international roaming fees and retail roaming prices
are larger and the quantities demanded for international
roaming lower than under symmetric domestic competition;
and,
2. if all the bargaining power is with the non-integrated operator
in country B, the equilibrium international roaming fees and
retail roaming prices are lower and the quantities demanded for
international roaming larger than under symmetric domestic
competition with international integration.
Monopoly in A and Duopoly in B with Integration
Proposition
Under asymmetric domestic competition with international
integration the equilibrium international roaming fee depends on
the relative bargaining power of the integrated structure and
non-integrated operator in country B as well as the degree of
competition between operators in country B.
I For an intermediate degree of competition between operators
in country B, γ ∈ ]γ∗, γ̂[, the equilibrium international
roaming fees and retail roaming prices are larger and the
quantities demanded for international roaming smaller than
under symmetric domestic competition.
I For a sufficiently high degree of competition between
operators in country B, γ ∈ ]γ̂, 1], the integrated structure
will effectively foreclose the non-integrated operator.
Monopoly in A and Duopoly in B with Integration
Corollary
If in the case of a bilateral monopoly one country’s operator enters
the other country, social welfare is worsened
1. for intermediate degrees of competition between operators in
the competitive country, i.e., for γ > γ∗;
2. for sufficiently low degrees of competition between operators
in the competitive country, i.e., for γ ≤ γ∗, if sufficient
bargaining power is with the integrated structure.
Corollary
If, in the case of competition in one country, the monopolist from
one country acquires one of the competitors in the other country,
social welfare is worsened irrespective of the distribution of
bargaining power between the integrated and the non-integrated
operators.
Conclusion
I Asymmetry in the competitive setup in the two countries and
bargaining power between providers matter
I for roaming charges and retail roaming prices;
I for deciding how much international integration of (alliances
between) operators inflate roaming charges and retail roaming
prices and whether there is an incentive to conclude a roaming
agreement at all.
I Mediated bargaining over the roaming charges may help
alleviate the problem of inflated roaming charges.
I Force roaming whenever competition in the more competitive
regions (countries) is too strong, as interregional operators
could foreclose small operators in those regions.
I Next step: Explicit modeling of the bargaining.
